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Monitoring Smartphones for Anomaly Detection 

 

 
 
Tags:  android  android virtual device  android devices 
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Published:  November 13, 2011
 
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Slide 1: Enhancing Security of Linux­based  Android Devices Aubrey­Derrick Schmidt, Hans­Gunther Schmidt, Jan Clausen, Kamer Ali Yüksel, Osman Kiraz, Ahmet Camtepe, and Sahin Albayrak This work was funded by Deutsche Telekom Laboratories
Slide 2: www.DAI­Labor.de  Research Institute with ~100 employees  Six core departments:  Agent Core Technologies  Next Generation Services  Information Retrieval  Cognitive Architectures  Education  Security 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 2
Slide 3: DAI­Labor Security Department  Works on:  Smartphone Security  Agent Security  Network Security Simulation  Critical Infrastructures  PKI / Cryptography  Next Generation Homes ­ Security 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 3
Slide 4: TOC  Motivation  Android Security  Adding Linux Security Tools to Android  Enhancing Security with self­built IDS 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 4
Slide 5: Motivation  Smartphones getting increasingly popular  Various smartphone malwares appeared  Signature­based approaches only efficient for  “known” malware  Anti­Virus engines need avg. time of 48 days to  get capable of detecting new malware [Oberheide08]  More than 700,000 can be infected via MMS in  about three hours [Bulygin07] 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 5
Slide 6: Motivation  Android already very popular (Java on  Linux)  Android sources will be set open­source   Opportunity to develop low­level security tools  for commonly used smartphones the first time  Linux security research is mature  A lot lessons learned  A lot of open source tools available 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 6
Slide 7: TOC  Motivation  Android Security  Adding Linux Security Tools to Android  Enhancing Security with self­built IDS 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 7
Slide 8: Android Security  Images on emulator  System Image (YAFFS2, 65 MB / 21 MB free)  Mounted to /system  OS files, libraries, drivers, system bins  Android config files  Android framework  Android base applications (e.g. Browser)  +R(W)X 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 8
Slide 9: Android Security  Images on emulator  Userdata Image (YAFFS2, 65 MB / 40 MB free)  Mounted to /data  Used for applications, user data, DRM, ...  +RWX  Cache Image (YAFFS2, usage not specified yet)  SD­Card Image (no “obvious” size limitations)  Mounted to /sdcard  Files created as user and group “system”  +RW 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 9
Slide 10: Android Security  Applications are “location­aware”  Can only be executed in /data or /system  Any changes on file permissions succeed there  Changes in e.g. /sdcard do not succeed (e.g.  set execute bit)  Most probably, (Linux) applications cannot be  started via SD­Card 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 10
Slide 11: Android Security  (Java) Application signing is required  Linux state not clear  developer signs his application with own  certificate at the moment  System might change to something similar to  Symbian OS  Central authority for assigning certificates  Limited access to APIs  Each, Goole and T­Mobile announced application store  (might include application testing and verification) 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 11
Slide 12: Android Security  File rights:  /data/data/<package.application_name>  “application land”  drwxr-xr-x app_14 app_14 2008-09-17 14:26 com.android.sample  Application can access other application  directories signed with identical certificates  “Certification land” 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 12
Slide 13: TOC  Motivation  Android Security  Adding Linux Security Tools to Android  Enhancing Security with self­built IDS 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 13
Slide 14: Adding Linux Security Tools to Android General Information  Emulator is used as basis  OHA/Google modified a lot of standard libraries  and binaries   Reason: opportunity for business costumers to  claim “intellectual property”  Application space is limited (~40 MB)  Common security tools were tested  But: special build environment needed 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 14
Slide 15: Creating a Build Environment for Android  Ubuntu 8.04  Two toolkits can be used  Sourcery cross­compile toolchain  Scratchbox cross­compilation toolkit  Emulated ARM environment  “Common” Linux file system layout 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 15
Slide 16: Creating a Build Environment for Android Important Facts  Files are located in:  System files are placed in /system  Binaries in /system/bin  Libraries in /system/lib  Config files in /system/etc  System configuration in OpenBinder  Page alignment causes changes in linking  Only way to get available applications run is  compiling them statically 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 16
Slide 17: Adding Tools  “Top 100 Network Security Tools” [Insec06]  Tested from 5 main categories:  Anti­Virus: ClamAV  Firewall: iptables  Rootkit Detectors: chkrootkit  Intrusion Detection: Snort  Other useful tools: Busybox, Bash, OpenSSH,  strace, Nmap  07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 17
Slide 18: Anti­Virus: ClamAV  Android Compatibility: Works  Problems, solutions, and size:  Static compilation (linking) required  Dependent on static compiled version of "zlib"  (zlib­1.2.3)  Total size of all ClamAV relevant files (approx. 28MB)  exceeds available size in System image  (21MB). ClamAV virus signature database needs to be  placed in a different location.  Size (approx.): 11140 KB libraries and binaries (/opt),  17324 KB database (/data) 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 18
Slide 19: Anti­Virus: ClamAV Results ----------- SCAN SUMMARY ----------Known viruses: 407205 Engine version: 0.94 Scanned directories: 0 Scanned files: 106 Infected files: 0 Data scanned: 5.12 MB Time: 107.236 sec (1 m 47 s) # 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 19
Slide 20: Firewall: iptables  Problems:  Kernel needs to be recompiled from source.  Sources can be freely downloaded from  Android Project website. Enable NETFILTER in  kernel configuration and recompile!  “iptables” cannot be compiled due to linker  issues: It requires statically compiled parts of  libc which Android does not provide. 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 20
Slide 21: Rootkit Detector: Chkrootkit  Android Compatibility: Works with minor  dependencies  Problems, solutions, and size:  Static compilation (linking) required  Requires "netstat" (provided by "busybox")  Requires standard directories (/lib, /etc, etc.)  provided by symbolic links pointing to the correct  Android directories  Size (approx.): 588 KB 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 21
Slide 22: Rootkit Detector: Chkrootkit Results # ./chkrootkit [: gid: unknown operand ROOTDIR is `/' Checking `amd'... not found Checking `basename'... INFECTED Checking `biff'... not found Checking `cron'... not infected Checking `echo'... INFECTED Checking `egrep'... not infected Checking `env'... INFECTED Checking `find'... not infected Searching for common ssh-scanners default files... nothing found Searching for suspect PHP files... find: /var/tmp: No such file or directory nothing found Searching for anomalies in shell history files... nothing found chkproc: Warning: Possible LKM Trojan installed chkdirs: Warning: Possible LKM Trojan installed Checking `sniffer'... ./chkrootkit: ./ifpromisc: not found 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 22
Slide 23: Intrusion Detection: Snort  Problems:  Dependencies to libpcap, libdnet, libnet, pcre  and iptables (all as statically compiled/linked  solutions)  Requires statically compiled/linked libc parts  which are not available on Android 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 23
Slide 24: Other Useful Tools: Busybox, Bash,  OpenSSH, strace, Nmap  Busybox: works  Bash: works  OpenSSH: Can be executed but is not fully  functional (requires users that do not exist  in the android environment)  strace: works  Nmap: works with minor dependencies 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 24
Slide 25: TOC  Motivation  Android Security  Adding Linux Security Tools to Android  Enhancing Security with self­built IDS 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 25
Slide 26: Enhancing Security with a Self­built  Intrusion Detection System 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 26
Slide 27: Detecting Intrusions and Malware Overview 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 27
Slide 28: Detecting Intrusions and Malware Static Function Call Approach  Planned to present metric for weighing  suspiciousness of function/system calls  Solution far more easier on Android  Simple decision tree can achieve 95%  detection rate  Tested with Linux malware  Some of them were recompiled for Android, but only  minor differences  Still has to be tested on real device!  07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 28
Slide 29: Detecting Intrusions and Malware Static Function Decision Tree __bss_start = y |   gethostbyname = y |   |   sigaction = y: normal |   |   sigaction = n: malicious |   gethostbyname = n |   |   fork = y |   |   |   strerror = y |   |   |   |    getgrgid = y: malicious |   |   |   |    getgrgid = n: normal |   |   |   strerror = n: malicious |   |   fork = n: normal ... continued __bss_start = n |    printf = y: malicious |    printf = n |    |    fprintf = y: malicious |    |    fprintf = n |    |    |    execv = y: malicious |    |    |    execv = n |    |    |    |    memmove = y: malicious |    |    |    |    memmove = n |    |    |    |    |    perror = y: malicious |    |    |    |    |    perror = n: malicious CC SEC Folie 29 continued on the right side 07.11.2007
Slide 30: Summary  Android Security  How to enhance security  Add Linux security tools  Light weight IDS 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 30
Slide 31: References  [Bulygin07] Y. Bulygin, “Epidemics of mobile worms,” in Proceedings of the  26th IEEE International Performance Computing and Communications  Conference, IPCCC 2007, April 11­13, 2007, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA.  IEEE Computer Society, 2007, pp. 475–478. [Oberheide08] J. Oberheide, E. Cooke, and F. Jahanian, “Cloudav: N­version  antivirus in the network cloud,” in Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security  Symposium (Security’08), San Jose, CA, July 2008. [Insec06] INSECURE.ORG, “Top 100 network security tools,” 2006. [Online].  Available: http://sectools.org/   07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 31
Slide 32: Thank you for your patience! Q&A 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 32
Slide 33: Contact Dipl.­Inf. Aubrey­Derrick Schmidt Researcher +49 (0) 30 / 314 – 74 039 +49 (0) 30 / 314 – 74 003 Hans­Gunther Schmidt Student Researcher +49 (0) 30 / 314 – 74 041 +49 (0) 30 / 314 – 74 003 aubrey.schmidt@dai­labor.de hans­gunther.schmidt@dai­labor.de 07.11.2007 CC SEC Folie 33

   
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